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Abstract
Is it possible to increase growth and welfare by raising taxes and
disposing of the tax revenues? We show this may indeed be the case
in a simple model with endogenous technical change, represented by
an increase in the variety of intermediate goods.
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The prediction that permanent variations in tax rates would give rise to
di¤erent steady-state growth rates has long been an hallmark of the en-
dogenous growth literature. In contrast to the older neoclassical framework,
where long-run growth was exogenously determined by the rate of technical
progress, these models predict that increases in tax rates would induce lower
growth rates ( see, for example the surveys in Myles 2000 and Jones and
Manuelli 2005). In particular many studies focus on R&D activities, a major
driving force for growth, and to …scal incentives for these activities, which
are subsidized in many industrial countries. One limitation of these studies
is that they often treat labor supply as inelastic, thereby abstracting from
the decision to allocate time between work and leisure. In this paper we
show a non obvious result for …scal policy that is made possible by allowing
for ‡exible labour supply in R&D models: the fact that lump taxes can have
positive e¤ects on growth even when the revenue is not used in a productive
way.
It should be certainly possible to return the revenue to agents in such a
way as to increase their welfare. However assuming as we do that the revenue
is not returned allows us a closer view of one channel through which …scal
policy can work. In particular it is often found in theoretical models that
growth can be increased by subsidies to R&D …nanced through lump-sum
taxes (see for example Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004, chap. 6, or Zeng and
Zhang 2002). Here we show that with a ‡exible labour supply, lump-sum
taxes can in themselves increase growth and welfare i.e. have a direct e¤ect
on them.
The mechanism which is at work is the following: a lump-sum tax in-
duces a negative income e¤ect thereby inducing agents to work more. More
employment raises the returns to the R&D activity. Growth and welfare are
therefore increased.
We conduct our study by using a standard model of endogenous techno-
logical progress with an in…nitely lived representative agent, originally pro-
posed by Romer (1990) and presented in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004),
chap. 6. Entrepreneurs spend a …xed cost in order to develop new interme-
diate goods. Each chooses to produce the same amount of each intermediate
good. Output in the …nal goods production sector is linear in the number
of intermediate goods used so unbounded growth is possible. The basic dif-
ference in assumptions with respect to this benchmark model is that the
1decision to supply labour is explicitly analysed. We study the long-run ef-
fects e¤ects of a lump-sum tax whose proceeds are thrown away and …nd
that such a tax will increase growth and will increase welfare for a broad
region of the parameters space. The intuition is simply that in our model,
lump-sum taxes have an impact on the allocation of resources, because they
in‡uence labour supply and consequently the rate of return on capital and
the rate of growth. In the example which we consider, the income e¤ect of a
wasted lump-sum tax causes households to consume less leisure and supply
more labour. This causes an increase in the interest rate and the long-run
rate of growth.
Our result is an example of second-best theory. The idea that taxes whose
revenue is not used productively must reduce welfare is based on the …rst-
best intuition that a waste of resources has a positive social cost. However
the withdrawal of resources from productive use may have a social bene…t
in an economy in which there is imperfect competition, i.e. in a second-best
environment.
Another contribution of our analysis is the following: as said above it is
very frequent in works studying the e¤ects of …scal expenditures to assume
…nancing by lump-sum taxation, taken to be non distortionary, or to assume
that proceeds of taxes are returned lump-sum (e.g. Devereux and Love 1995,
Lin and Russo 1999, Turnovsky 2000, Zeng and Zhang 2002, Haruyama and
Itaya 2006, Gomez 2007). However we show that, with elastic labour supply,
through general equilibrium e¤ects a lump-sum tax will change relative prices
and therefore be indirectly distortionary. In other words the e¤ect on growth
of a tax whose revenue is returned lump-sum will be di¤erent from the e¤ect
on growth of a tax whose proceeds are just thrown away and can correspond
to lower growth and welfare: they should therefore be studied separately.
Assuming leisure inelastic Marrero and Novales (2007) show that lump sum
taxes are never negative when public expenditure has to be …nanced, but
that it is better to complement them with income taxes to avoid excessive
crowding out of consumption.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 the model is
presented, section 3 describes the equilibrium conditions which have to hold
in the model, section 4 focuses on the balanced growth path characteristics
of the model, section 5 analyises the e¤ects of a lump-sum tax in the model,
section 6 does some simple numerical calculations to show that such a tax
can increase welfare for widely accepted estimates of the relevant parameters.
22 A Model
We present a simple growth model with endogenous technological progress
consisting in the expansion of the variety of intermediate goods. Our mod-
eling starts with the version of Romer (1990) proposed by Barro and Sala-i
-Martin (2004) and extends it by allowing for elastic labour supply.
2.1 Firms
Following Spence (1976) and Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) the production function of
…rm i in the …nal good sector is given by :






where Y (i) is the amount produced and L(i) is labour used by …rm i and
x(i;j) is the quantity this …rm uses of the intermediate good indexed by j.
For tractability both i and j are treated as continuous variables. We assume
0 < ￿ < 1. The …nal good production sector is competitive and we assume a
continuum of length one of identical …rms. We can then suppress the index
i to avoid notational clutter. Firms maximize pro…ts given by




where W is the wage and P(j) is the price of the intermediate good j. By













Since the …rms in the …nal good production sector are competitive, their
pro…ts are zero in equilibrium. In contrast for the …rms producing interme-
diate goods patent, the new intermediate good invented then earn monopoly
pro…ts for ever. The cost of production of the intermediate good j, once it
has been invented, is given by one unit of …nal good. The value of the patent
3for the jth intermediate good v(j;t) at time t is the present discounted value






where r(s;t) is the average interest rate during the period of time from t to
s.
The inventor of the jth intermediate good chooses P(j) to maximize prof-
its (P(j) ￿ 1)x(j) where x(j) is given by 3, so for each j:










so if labour supply is constant, and the interest rate is constant, we have













We show below that labour supply and the interest rate are indeed constant
in the balanced growth equilibrium.
The cost of development of new products is ￿ and there is free entry of
inventors. So by equating the value and the cost of inventions, in steady




















1￿￿(1 ￿ ￿) (9)






and plugging 10 in 4 we have:





Thus the interest rate is proportional to labour supply and the wage does
not depend on labour supply. With time the number of intermediate goods
4increases. The wage grows proportionally to the number of intermediate
goods while the interest rate remains the same. Notice a higher labour supply
implies a higher quantity of each intermediate goods in equilibrium. Inventors
have larger sales and incomes and are therefore able and willing to pay a
higher equilibrium interest rate on their debt ￿:
2.2 Households






￿￿t (ln(C) + h(L))dt (12)
Labour supply L ranges from zero to 1 and
h
0(L) < 0;h
00(L) < 0 (13)
We choose a logarithmic speci…cation for utility because it is consistent with
additive separability in consumption and leisure, which makes it easier to
clarify the mechanism we are studying and because it is suggested by recent
estimates. 1Notice that this impies that labour and consumption are both
normal goods.
Equation 14 gives the instantaneous budget constraint consumers face:
I = rF + WL ￿ C ￿ ta
__
F (14)
where I is investment and F is wealth. Households derive their income by
loaning entrepreneurs their wealth (of which all have the same initial en-
dowment) and by supplying labour L to …rms in the …nal goods production
1The literature on estimation of the IES uses a wide variety of models and data sets.
Using the US aggregate consumption data, Hall (1988) found that expected interest rates
had no e¤ect on consumption growth. Attanasio and Weber (1993) showed evidence
of aggregation bias in testing the Euler equation with aggregate data. Beaudry and van
Wincoop (1996) also showed that aggregate data was uninformative in the point estimate of
the IES and used a panel of state-level data to conclude that the IES estimate was probably
close to one. More recently Vissing-Jorgensen and Attanasio (2003) and Mulligan (2004)
results are roughly consistent with log utility speci…cations.
5sector, taking the interest rate r and the wage W as given. There are lump-
sum taxes proportional to average wealth,
__
F ;where given our normalization,
F =
__
F . Agents, being atomistic, take these averages as variables beyond
their control. In this sense these are lump-sum taxes.











= ￿ ￿ r (15)
and
￿W + h






We also have the transversality condition:
lim
t!1￿F exp(￿￿t) = 0 (18)
3 Government
We assume that government consumption G does not enter the utility func-
tion of consumers or the production function of …rms. That is we want to
study the e¤ect of taxes, without considering the possible productive uses of
the tax revenue. We rule out a market for government bonds and assume
that the government runs a balanced budget. The ‡ow government budget
constraint can be written
G = ta￿N (19)
4 Market Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium for this economy is de…ned as a set of market-
clearing prices and quantities such that
6(i) the household’s choice of C, I, L maximizes 12 subject to 14, given
the initial endowments of F and taking as given the path of factor returns
and …scal policy variables;
(ii) the …nal sector …rms’ choice of L and x, given the path of prices, and
the intermediate sector …rms’ choice of prices, given the demand for their
goods, maximize pro…ts; the value of the patent on each intermediate good
is equal to the cost of its invention;
(iv) the government obeys its budget constraint.
The social budget constraint is then given by:
Y ￿ xN = C + I + G (20)
where total intermediate goods used xN is subtracted from …nal production
Y to obtain total value added. All investment in the model is investment in
research and development of new intermediate goods so ￿
:
N = I and F = ￿N.
Thus, the social budget constraint can be rewritten as:
￿
:
N = Y ￿ xN ￿ C ￿ G (21)
5 Balanced Growth
We consider only the balanced growth path (hence BGP) of the model labour
supply and therefore the rate of interest (by 9) and the quantity produced of
each intermediate good (by 7) are constant while the rate of growth of other
variables is constant as well. When labour supply is constant, 11 implies that
the wage and the number of intermediate goods grow at the same rate and









where ￿ is de…ned as the BGP rate of growth. Equations 15, 21 and 22 imply
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using the factor exhaustion condition that the wage bill plus total interest
payments is equal to GNP, that is Y ￿ xN = r￿N + WL, and substituting


















The equation on the left-hand side of 23 is the Euler equation and gives
us the BGP rate of growth of consumption as a function of labour only, as
the interest rate is a positive linear function of labour (see 9). The equation
on the right-hand side, i.e. the social budget constraint, gives us the BGP
rate of growth of intermediate goods again as a function of labour, given
that W/N is a constant (see 11). We can then represent 23 as in …gure 1,
where the Euler equation is the curve labelled
:
C
C, while the social budget
constraint is the graph labelled
:
N
N. Both curves are increasing in L but the
:
N
N curve is steeper than the
:
C
C curve. In fact the interest rate appears in the
same fashion in both curves but there are two additional terms in L, WL
￿N and
W
￿Nh0(L), appearing only in the
:
N
N curve. These terms are both increasing in
L, given 11 and 13. The fact that the
:
N
N curve is always steeper than the
:
C
C means that there is at most one point of intersection of the two curves.
If the curves do intersect for 0 < L < 1 and the transversality condition is
respected when they intersect, the point of intersection gives us the BGP
rate of growth ￿ on the vertical axis and the BGP labour supply e L on the
horizontal axis. In fact the transversality condition will always hold in a
steady state as the amount of wealth and its shadow value grow at opposite
rates.We conclude that if a BGP equilibrium exists it is unique. Below we
introduce a speci…c version of h which implies existence of a solution e L to
23.
6 E¤ects of Taxes
It is relatively simply to calculate the e¤ects of taxes on labour supply in










+ ￿ = 0 (24)











Since h00(L) < 0 the e¤ect of the lump-sum tax on labour supply is
positive. This can be interpreted as a simple income e¤ect: for …xed labour
supply, the tax would make households poorer so since both consumption
and leisure are normal goods they consume less and o¤er more labour. It is
easy to calculate the e¤ect of the lump-sum tax on the rate of growth, since
the rate of growth of consumption increases one for one with the interest rate
and the interest rate is proportional to labour supply. Thus by 25, 9 and 11









￿ > 0 (26)
The positive e¤ect of the tax on labour supply and growth is illustrated
in Figure 2. An increase in the tax leaves the
:
C




N curve down. The intersection point then moves north-east, that is
both the BGP labour supply and the BGP rate of growth increase.
7 Welfare Analysis
Given ￿; and e L; the rate of growth and the level of labour along along a










































9where N(0) is the initial stock of patents. Thus the derivative of welfare with



















dL > 0 and dL
d￿a > 0 the sign of the e¤ect of ￿a on welfare is ambiguous
as the …rst two terms in large parentheses in 29 are negative while the third
is positive.
7.1 A numerical example
We now show that the positive e¤ect of lump-sum taxes on welfare is possible
for ranges of parameter values consistent with estimates available in the





If ￿ > 0 the marginal disutility of labour increases with labour. Using 30 the








+ ￿ = 0: (31)
The left-hand side of the balanced growth equilibriumcondition 31 is monoton-
ically increasing in labour. In particular the expression increases monotoni-
cally from ￿1 to ￿￿￿a when L goes from 0 to 1. All of the terms in 31 are
















Equation 9 shows that the term r
L is the same positive constant for any L,
￿ or ￿a. Inspection of the balanced growth equilibrium condition 31 shows
that if ￿a = 0, e L goes to 1 as ￿ goes to 0. Thus as ￿ goes to 0, the sum of the
…rst two terms in large parentheses in 32 goes to ￿(1 + ￿) while the third
term goes to +1. Therefore, a small wasted lump-sum tax causes increased
welfare if ￿ is low enough. An intuitive explanation of this result is that
the wasted lump-sum tax causes increased growth which is very valuable if
consumers are patient.
10More generally, the value generally used for ￿ in calibration exercises is
0.04. If we set ￿ to 0.02, which is an estimate of the average per capita GDP
for the US in the last …fty years, the implied value for the BGP interest rate
is then 0.06. If we set L=0.2, dV
d￿a will then be positive for ￿ as high as 1.48.
If we set L=0.3 dV
d￿a will be positive for ￿ as high as 1.45 approximately. If
we set ￿ to 0.03 the implied value for the BGP interest rate is then 0.07. As
the expression inside the parenthesis in 32 is increasing in r we get higher
upper bounds for ￿ in this case( with L=0.3, ￿ must be lower than 1.7, 1
while with L=0.2 ￿ must be lower than 1.74). In principle￿ can be estimated
by estimating the compensated elasticity of labour supply, of which it is the
reciprocal.2 However available estimates from micro data vary from large to
zero, due to measurement errors and sample selection bias problems: Bor-
jas (2008) o¤ers a recent overview of the literature and indicates that 0.1 is
somehow a consensus value for males while labour supply for females is gen-
erally thought to be more elastic ( see Blau and Kahn 2006). Macroeconomic
models often assume much higher values for this elasticity. The argument is
that ‡uctuations of hours are mainly accounted for by participation rates, so
that the important margin is the extensive rather than the intensive one con-
sidered in micro-studies (see for further discussion Rogerson and Wallenius
2007 and Chang and Kim 2006).
In conclusion, if labour supply is unresponsive to the wage rate standard
results as regards lump-sum taxation emerge. However our analysis suggests
that for parameter values widely used in macroeconomic analysis unconven-
tional e¤ects could appear.
8 Conclusions
We o¤er a simple example to show that it is possible for taxes to cause in-
creased welfare in a model of endogenous technological progress even when
the …scal revenue is thrown away. This is possible if inventors have a monopoly
on their inventions and earn quasi rents which increase when labour supply
increases. Imperfect competition implies that the market equilibrium is not
…rst best and policy can have counterintuitive e¤ects. In particular we have
demonstrated that the wealth e¤ect of a wasted lump-sum tax causes in-
creased labour supply which implies an increased interest rate and faster
2￿ is in fact the reciprocal of the elasticity of labour supply with respect to the wage,
keeping constant the marginal utility of wealth, i.e. the so called Frisch elasticity.
11growth. This can cause increased welfare for parameter values widely used
for calibration purposes. We have started our enquiry by focusing on log-
arithmic preferences, because additive separability of the utility function
o¤ers greater tractability, but we are planning to extend our analysis to the
case of a more general class of preferences. Also we will explore the e¤ects
of lump-sum taxes in a quality ladder model of growth driven by R&D and
in a model with human capital.
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